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The continuations procedure within the U.S. patent system has been criticized for enabling firms to
manipulate the patent review process for strategic purposes.  Changes during the 1990s in patent procedures
affected the incentives of applicants to exploit the continuations process, and additional reforms in
continuations currently are being considered.  Nonetheless, little is known about applicants' use of
the three major types of continuations -- the Continuation Application (CAP), the Continuations-In-Part
(CIP), and Divisions -- to alter the term and scope of patents.  This paper analyzes patents issued from
the three types of continuations to U.S. firms during 1981 - 2004 (with priority years 1981 - 2000),
and links their frequency to the characteristics of patents, assignees and industries.  We find that CIPs
are disproportionately filed by R&D-intensive, small firms that patent heavily, and are more common
in chemical and biological technologies.  Patents resulting from CIP filings contain more claims and
backward citations per patent on average, and cover relatively "valuable" inventions.  In contrast, CAPs
cover less valuable patents from large, capital-intensive firms that patent intensively, particularly in
computer and semiconductor patents.  We also analyze the effects of the 1995 change in patent term
on continuation applications and find that the Act reduced the use of continuations overall, while shifting
the output of CAPs toward "less important" patents.
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1.    Introduction 
A large literature spanning economics, law, and strategic management has considered the 
strategic use by firms of intellectual property, including patents.  Among the topics 
covered by this literature are the causes of increased patenting (Kortum & Lerner 1999, 
Hall 2005), firms’ decisions to acquire patents in fields in which company executives 
state that patents do not aid in appropriating the returns to innovation (Hall & Ziedonis 
2001), and the incidence and outcomes of patent litigation among firms (see Hall & 
Ziedonis 2007, as well as Somaya 2003).  The use by firms of patent examination 
procedures has received less attention from scholars, despite widespread 
acknowledgement by patent attorneys and other “IP professionals” of the importance of 
such procedures in the patent strategies of firms.  This paper examines the characteristics 
of firms using one such procedural strategy, the patent continuation, to shed light on 
motives for and effects of this strategy. 
The continuation procedure allows inventors to restart the examination of their 
patent application, retaining the filing date of a previous application that discloses the 
same invention.  Inventors can use continuations to revise their claims to reflect 
technological developments affecting their invention after their initial application or to 
respond to an examiner’s arguments and comments.  According to the U.S. Patent Office, 
the procedure, which has been a part of the U.S. patent system since 1863, is intended to 
“lead to a well-designed set of claims that give the public notice of precisely what the 
applicant regards as his or her invention” (Federal Register 2006 p 48).    4     
Continuations are unique to the U.S. patent system
1 and have been criticized by 
economists and members of the patent bar because of their potential for strategic 
manipulation, notably in so-called “submarine patents” that are issued following long 
periods of examination and revision through continuation applications (Graham & 
Mowery 2004).
 2  Other critics claim that continuations are used by applicants to badger 
examinees into granting patents of dubious quality, so-called “junk patents,” by 
repeatedly filing continuations on a single application (Quillen & Webster 2001).   But 
patent attorneys and industry groups defend the use of continuations (see for example, 
Biotechnology Industry Organization, 2006) to protect the high-risk investments of 
“pioneering inventors” in “young” fields of invention that are subject to uncertainty.  
Indeed, proposed changes in Japan’s patent examination system include procedures that 
resemble continuations.  A quasi-official Japanese patent policy research organization 
argues that the introduction of continuations into Japanese patent procedures “will 
promote front-runners to strategically obtain patents” (I IP Bulletin 2005, p.2-5). 
Not for the first time in patent policy, however, the debate over the use, abuse, 
benefits, and costs of the continuation procedure has been conducted in an evidentiary 
vacuum.  The limited empirical work on continuations to date (Graham 2004, Graham & 
                                                 
1 Continuation applications have been available to patentees in the United States since 1863.  In 
Godfrey v. Eames, 68 U.S. 317 (1863), the U.S. Supreme Court interpreted the Patent Act of 
1836 to allow continuation applications, in that case when the original application was abandoned 
on the same day that the new continued application was filed.  The use of continuing applications 
was also upheld by the Supreme Court in Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. Gutmann Co., 304 U.S. 159 
(1938) and General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Electric Co., 304 U.S. 175 (1938).   
2  The closest parallels in other patent systems are the Divisional available in the European and 
Japanese Patent Offices, and the option allowing for the selective prosecution of claims from a 
search report by the German Patent Office (Quillen & Webster 2001).  Since the 18-month 
publication requirement has been a part of the European Patent Convention since its inception, 
the opportunity for inventors to “hide” technology advances by using Divisions has been strictly 
limited.    5     
Mowery 2004) has focused on interindustry differences in the incidence of continuations.  
Little if any work has analyzed the characteristics of the patents or patentholders that 
exploit the continuation procedure in the U.S. patent system.  We do not know, for 
example, whether continuations are more likely to be filed in relatively “young” 
technological fields, or whether these applications more frequently cover “pioneering” 
inventions, as the Biotechnology Industry Organization asserts.  This paper analyzes the 
characteristics of U.S. corporate patents that are subject to the three major types of 
continuations (see below for definition and discussion of these three types) and examines 
the use of all three types among publicly listed firms and technological fields during the 
1981-2004 period. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows.  Section 2 describes the role of 
continuations in the patent examination process, discussing procedural differences among 
the three types of continuations: the Continuation Application; the Continuation-In-Part; 
and the Division.  Section 3 describes the construction of our data, compares the 
characteristics of continued patents with those of patents not subject to continuations, and 
analyzes variations in the use of each practice among technology classes.  Section 4 deals 
with the continuations propensity of U.S. corporate patentees and Section 5 analyzes the 
effects of the change in patent term that became effective in 1995 (see below for further 
discussion) on the incidence and characteristics of continuations. Section 6 summarizes 
and discusses the implications of our findings. 
 
2.   Continuations: Provisions and Practice 
2.1   The patent review process and continuations    6     
  The USPTO patent review process starts with the inventor filing an application 
containing a written description of her invention.  This description is formalized in legal 
language by “claims” that define the invention covered by the application.  The examiner 
compares the claims against existing knowledge or “prior art” to determine whether or 
not the application meets the standards of patentability.  This “patent prosecution” 
process may result in the application being accepted or rejected in its entirety or (more 
likely) the rejection of one or more claims by the examiner.  The applicant can respond to 
a rejection of claims by disclosing additional information showing that her claims are 
valid, or by narrowing them to accommodate prior art and/or the examiner’s suggestions.  
The examiner reviews this response and may allow the patent claim, suggest 
modifications, or issue a “final rejection” of the application.
3  This entire process can go 
through several rounds, each of which lasts 2-3 years on average, and has been 
characterized as a “give-and-take-affair” between the applicant and the examiner (Merges 
1997).
4  
2.2   Types of Continuations 
                                                 
3 A determined applicant faced with a “final rejection” can pursue several options, including a 
Request for Continued Examination (RCE), which may or may not contain amendments to the 
original application, so long as it discloses the same invention. This application is treated like a 
new application, giving the applicant another chance for her claims to be allowed, amended, or 
even reviewed by a different examiner, while preserving the “priority date” of the original patent 
application (Lemley & Moore 2004). In the U.S. system, however, the 
continuation/divisional/CIP routinely is assigned to the examiner who handled the parent case. 
Exceptions occur if the examiner has retired from the USPTO or has been promoted to a position 
that does not include examining patent applications. Another exception occurs if the Office of 
Initial Patent Examination had classified the child application into a very different patent 
classification than the parent application.  In that case it would go to a different art unit and thus 
to a different examiner. Applicants do not have a say in deciding who prosecutes their application 
(Personal communication with Carl Oppedahl, patent lawyer, January 21, 2006). 
4 The applicant also can seek an interview with the examiner, where she tries to persuade the 
examiner of the patentability of her claims, or appeal the rejection to the Board of Patent Appeals 
and Interferences and if unsuccessful there, to the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia 
or to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.    7     
Continuations permit an applicant to refile a pending patent application,
5 with or 
without substantial modifications, by renewing at least some portion of the original 
application.  There are three types of “continuations”:  the “Continuation Application” 
(abbreviated hereafter as the CAP), the “Continuation-In-Part (CIP),” and the 
“Division.”
6  The Continuation Application discloses the identical invention claimed in 
the prior “parent” non-provisional application before the parent application was patented 
or abandoned.  The disclosure presented in the CAP must be the same as that of the 
original application; i.e., the continuation should not include anything that would 
constitute new matter if inserted in the original application.
7  The CIP includes a 
substantial portion or all of the parent application and adds matter not disclosed in that 
application, although the benefit of early priority is awarded only for the original 
disclosures contained in the new application.  A Division or divisional application occurs 
when the original application contains more than one independent invention.  In such a 
case, the USPTO allows the applicant to “elect” one of the disclosed inventions for 
continued examination.  The other inventions disclosed in the parent application can be 
withdrawn and pursued in new applications called Divisions.  A new application can be 
filed as a divisional application and benefit from the early filing date of the parent 
application only if it discloses and claims subject matter disclosed in the “original” or 
“parent” application. 
                                                 
5 35 USC § 120 (1991). Benefit of earlier filing date in the United States. 
6 The continuation and continuation-in-part are authorized under 35 USC § 120 “Benefit of earlier 
filing date in the United States.”  Divisions are authorized under 35 USC § 121 “Divisional 
applications.” 
7 The fee required to request a continuing application is no higher than that for filing a first 
application—$710 in 2001, and $355 for small entities.  37 C.F.R. 17(e).    8     
All three types of continuations introduce a delay in the prosecution and final 
issue decision for a U.S. patent application and permit the applicant to adopt the date of 
the application that is still pending within the Patent Office.
8,9  So long as the original 
“parent” application and the follow-up continuation application disclose the same 
invention, the applicant can preserve the parent application’s filing date.  Because an 
application may be continued any number of times, and because there is no limit to the 
number of times that a parent application may be abandoned, continuations can be used 
to prevent the patent examiner from reaching a decision on a patent application.  Strings 
of continuations may thus develop, with issue decisions being postponed for decades.
10  
Prior to 1999, all U.S. patent applications remained secret until the issue of the patent, 
enabling applicants to maintain the secrecy of their application throughout this extended 
period.   
Revisions in U.S. patent law that became effective in 1995 changed the term of 
patent protection from 17 years from the date of patent issue to 20 years from the 
application date.  This change sought (among other things) to reduce the incentives for 
inventors to pursue “submarine” patents.  An inventor seeking a “submarine” patent 
                                                 
8 In case of the CIP, only those claims that are carried over from the original application receive 
the benefit of the priority date. 
9 The application must meet certain conditions.  Under 35 USC § 120, a patent application is 
entitled to adopt the filing date of a “parent” application when (1) both applications disclose the 
same invention; (2) both applications are filed by the same inventor; (3) both applications are 
simultaneously co-pending; (4) the earlier application meets the disclosure requirements of 35 
USC § 112; and (5) the later application contains a specific reference to the earlier application.  
Sampson v. Ampex Corp. (1971, DC NY), 333 F. Supp. 59, aff’d. (2
nd Cir. NY) 463 F2d 1042.  
The language of 35 USC § 120 was initially adopted in the Patent Act of 1952, and legislative 
history suggests that the section was intended to write existing legal practice on the issue into the 
statute.  In re. Henriksen, 55 C.C.P.A. 1384 (1968).  
10 See, for instance, Jerome Lemelson’s U.S. patent 5,283,641, Apparatus and methods for 
automated analysis, issued February 1, 1994.  The priority date of this patent was December 24, 
1954, and there were no fewer than eleven continuations in this patent’s chain while it languished 
in the patent office for 39 years.    9     
submitted an application, thereby establishing a priority date for her invention, and filed 
numerous continuations on the initial application, which remained secret throughout the 
period of USPTO review of repeated revisions (continuations) in the original application.  
Even after the 1995 changes in patent term, continuations offered some strategic benefits 
to an applicant by allowing an extended period of secrecy prior to the issue of a patent, 
but this benefit was reduced by 1999 legislation mandating the publication of most patent 
applications 18 months after their submission.
11  The “publication” requirement, 
however, has not removed all of the benefits of continuations. Applicants can still make 
changes to individual claims reported in the published disclosure, and thus can use the 
continuation procedure to extend the period of secrecy during review by at least 18 
months for these individual claims (Glazier, 1997).
12 
The effects of these changes in U.S. IPR policy on continuations are unclear, for 
several reasons.  The 1995 change in patent term forced patentees using the continuations 
procedure to forego some portion of the patent term in exchange for a longer period of 
pendency.  But this tradeoff may be of far less significance in technologies for which 
product life cycles are short (e.g., software) than in sectors exhibiting longer product life 
cycles, such as drugs and chemicals.  Moreover, the 1999 Act allows applicants to “opt 
out” of the 18-month publication requirement for patents filed solely in the United States, 
                                                 
11 The US patent law now requires the publication of all applications after 18 months, but 
applicants are granted automatic exemptions from this requirement by filing a statement that they 
have no intention of filing the application in a foreign jurisdiction that requires an 18-month 
publication of its patent applications.  
12 For example, an applicant may use the continuation procedure to make subtle changes in one or 
more claims consistent with the original disclosure, but not identical to the original published 
claims.  The continuation may thus delay issue of the patent while the applicant observes the uses 
to which the technology is put in the marketplace, and alters the claim accordingly.  Thus, when 
the patent ultimately is allowed to issue, the technology disclosed in the patent may be of no 
surprise to competitors, but the precise boundaries of the claims may be a surprise, thus allowing 
the patentee to demand royalties from competitors infringing on the altered claim.    10     
meaning that some “submarine incentives” may remain for applicants who do not file 
applications outside of the United States.  The U.S. remains a huge market, and the 
ability of applicants to recapture their foreign-filing rights has yet to be tested in the U.S. 
courts.  The effects of the publication requirement on post-1999 applicants’ use of 
continuations therefore may be limited.  Indeed, as late as 2005, well after the 1995 and 
1999 reforms, continuation filings accounted for 30% of all applications received by the 
PTO (Federal Register 2006).
13   
Despite extensive debate over the benefits, costs, uses, and abuses of 
continuations, there exists little if any analysis of the characteristics of patents subject to 
continuations and the characteristics of the assignees of continued patents.  Nor has the 
overall importance of continuations before 1995 in U.S. patenting or the effects of the 
1995 statutory changes on the incidence and characteristics of continuations been 
examined.  We address the following questions in our analysis of continuation 
applications: 
1.  How do important characteristics (number of claims, forward and backward 
citations, payment of patent-renewal fees) of issued patents subject to continuations 
and/or continuations of different types compare with those of corporate patents overall? 
2. Are continuations concentrated in “emerging” fields of inventive activity, 
which may be subject to greater uncertainty concerning claims or feasibility? To what 
                                                 
13 During 2005, the PTO received approximately 317,000 nonprovisional applications, of which 
about 63,000 were continuing applications and about 52,000 were requests for continued 
examination. Thus, about thirty percent (63,000 + 52,000)/(317,000 + 52,000) of the Office’s 
patent examining resources must be applied to examining continued examination filings that 
require reworking earlier applications instead of examining new applications (Federal Register 
2006, p 50). Recent proposals for patent reform (dated 2006) seek to curtail the practice by 
limiting applicants to two continuations per application.        11     
extent are assignees using the practice to patent inventions in fields in which they have 
not previously been active (and therefore may be more likely to revise their applications), 
i.e., fields in which they might be described as recent entrants or as “pioneers?” 
3.  What are the characteristics (e.g., patenting intensity, capital intensity, size) of 
corporate assignees of continued patents, and have these characteristics changed since the 
1995 changes in patent term?  Do the characteristics of assignees differ among 
continuation types? 
 
3.   The data 
Our empirical analysis utilizes U.S. utility patents granted between 1981 and 2004 from 
the NBER patent database (Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg 2001), and the United States 
Patent and Trademark Office.  We gathered the continuations history of each patent from 
the “Related Patent Data” on the wrapper of patent documents, which reports the type of 
continuation applied for and their application dates.  From the latter, we calculated the 
“priority date” as the date on which the first in a series of continuation applications was 
filed in office.  For patents that were never subject to the continuations procedure 
(referred to below as “ordinary” patents), the first and only application date is the priority 
date.  Next, we separated patents that were subject to only one type of continuation (the 
CAP, CIP, or Division) from those that resulted from multiple continuation types 
(referred to below as “Combination” continuations).  
The USPTO assigns patents to one of nearly 500 technology classes.  We used the 
NBER classification developed by Hall et al. (2001) to aggregate the 500 classes into 36 
two-digit technological subcategories for use in our regression analyses, and further    12     
combined these 36 subcategories into 6 main categories: Chemical; Computers and 
Communications; Drugs and Medical; Electrical and Electronics; Mechanical; and Others 
(the subcategories that are aggregated to the main categories are apparent from Table 4). 
3.1  The frequency of continuations 
  Since we are primarily interested in the continuations behavior of U.S. firms, we 
exclude other assignees (foreign, government, individual and unassigned applicants) in 
our patent dataset. Patents assigned to U.S. corporations are more likely to have 
undergone a continuations procedure than those in any other assignee category (see 
Graham 2004 for a comparison of the continuations propensities of different assignee 
classes).  Indeed, U.S.-owned corporations and small businesses are assigned 44% of all 
patents in our dataset, but 55% of the patents with a history of at least one continuation 
application.
14  Table 1 summarizes the use of the three different types of continuations 
(the share of each type as a share of all corporate-assigned continued patents) by year of 
issue during 1981 – 2004 for the 1,122,935 patents that were assigned to U.S. 
corporations.   
 
Table 1 here 
 
Continuation applications take longer on average to issue than applications that 
are not continued.  Patents that were not subject to continuations are granted 2.2 years 
from the date of first application (standard deviation of 1.1), but applications subject to 
the procedure pend for 4.4 years (s.d. of 2.3) on average.  The longer pendency for 
                                                 
14 This category is identified by assignee code number 2 in the USPTO patent records. Over 96% 
of patents in this category are assigned to corporations (Hall, et al. 2001).  Note that some 
universities patent under university-owned foundation and corporations.    13     
continued patents introduces a truncation bias that makes it problematic to infer trends in 
continuation applications from patents issued during the later years of our study.
15  We 
deal with this truncation problem by using the priority year or date of first application for 
the patents in our dataset, and limit our analysis to the 966,020 patents applied for during 
1981 – 2000 and issued during 1981 – 2004.
16   
 
Figure 1 here 
 
Figure 1 depicts trends in continuation types by priority year.  Continuation 
applications were common between 1981 and 2000 -- 29% of all corporate-assigned 
patents applied for during the period included at least one continuation in their review.  
The practice peaked in the half-decade preceding 1995, with nearly 40% of applications 
during the period issued via continuations.  For the entire 1981 – 2000 period, CAPs were 
the most common type of continuations, accounting for 30% of all patents within these 
data that had been through the continuations procedure at least once.  The shares of CIP’s 
and Divisions are slightly smaller, at 28% and 22% respectively.  Within our U.S.-firm 
sample, 20% of all continuation patents are “Combinations,” i.e. including more than one 
type of continuation in their prosecution history. 
                                                 
15 In other words, ceteris paribus, a patent that was applied for in 2003 and was not subject to a 
continuations procedure is more likely to show up among patents issued in or before 2006 as 
compared to a patent that was first applied for in the same year, but was subject to continuations 
after.  
16 63% of continuation patents (but 96% of “ordinary” patents) issue with a pendency period of 4 
years or less and 94% of continuation patents issue with a pendency period of 8 years or less.  
Nearly 37% of the continuation patents with a priority date of 2000 have not issued by 2004, and 
6% of continuation patents with a 1996 priority date have not issued by that year.  Figure A1 in 
the Appendix plots the distribution of “pendency,” lags between priority and issue years, for 
continuation and ordinary patents.  Table A1 disaggregates mean pendency lags by continuation 
type.    14     
3.2   Characteristics of continued patents 
  We next compare the characteristics of patents resulting from the three types of 
continuations with each other and with ordinary patents.  The characteristics are: the 
number of claims, the number of backward and forward citations, and the payment by the 
patentholder of patent renewal fees four years after issue.  We briefly describe each of 
these variables before presenting our findings. 
(i)  Claims: The claims in a patent define in formal language the novel technical 
features of the invention, and delineate the breadth of its “scope” or the technological 
space being protected.  Controlling for technology class, the number of claims in a patent 
is correlated with its economic value (Lanjouw & Schankerman 2004).  Lanjouw & 
Schankerman (2001) also found that litigated patents had a significantly higher average 
number of claims than did a control group of non-litigated patents.  For this study, we use 
the number of claims for patents granted between 1981 and 1997. 
(ii) Backward citations: Inventors are required to be assiduous in their 
identification of relevant prior art in their applications. The patent examiner further 
verifies that all appropriate previous patents have been cited.  These “backward 
citations,” along with claims, delineate novelty in the applicant’s invention and the rights 
granted in the patent.  Backward citations reveal various aspects of the technological 
lineage of inventions.  A patent with a large number of backward citations to patents 
assigned to other entities indicates that the inventor is operating in a crowded 
technological area with a number of “nearby” patents and competitors.
 17   Patents that 
include a large share of “self citations,” i.e. citations to an assignee’s own patents in these 
backward citations, are more heavily based upon the inventor’s own prior inventive work, 
                                                 
17 Citing a number of backward references also makes a patent harder to challenge in court.      15     
rather than those of competitors, and may not indicate a crowded inventive landscape.  
Patents with a large number of backward citations that are dispersed across different 
patent classes arguably span a broader spectrum of prior art, and scholars characterize 
patents with more broadly dispersed backward citations as representing more “original” 
inventions than patents that draw mainly on prior art within the same class (Jaffe & 
Trajtenberg 2002).  
We obtained the number of prior patents cited by each patent in our study, the 
percentage of these references that were self-citations, and the technology classes of the 
cited patents.  From the latter, we calculated a Herfindahl index of backward reference 
concentration which is 0 when all backward citations are to patents from a single class 
(low “originality”) and 1 for the case of perfect dispersion. 
Beginning with patents applied for in 2001, the USPTO distinguished between 
applicant- and examiner- inserted citations in patents on the wrapper of the issued patent.  
Data on post-2001 patents reveal that the PTO is responsible for as much as 40% of all 
prior patent references in an “average” patent, potentially reflecting the different 
incentives of applicants and examiners in representing “prior art.”  Indeed, if applicants 
use the continuations procedure to strengthen their applications (either by redefining 
claims in CAPs or by inserting new ones in CIPs), then the resulting patent should 
contain a higher proportion of citations inserted by applicants than is true for a non-
continuation patent. 
(iii) Forward citations: Citations to a patent made in subsequent patents indicate 
that the invention or information in the cited patent contributed to the development of 
later inventions.  Forward citations are commonly used in empirical analysis as indicators    16     
of the technological importance of patents.  Since citations arrive after a patent has been 
granted, they can arrive at any point of time in the patent’s life, and it is likely that older 
patents will accumulate more citations.  This truncation problem means that patents 
granted in more recent years will appear to be less technologically important, on average.  
Restricting forward citations to those appearing in patents issuing within four years after 
the issue of the cited patent addresses this problem, while allowing us to examine forward 
citations for patents granted as late as 2002. 
(iv) Patent Renewals: Patent renewal fees were introduced in the United States in 
1982 for patents applied for after that year. Patentholders are required to pay renewal fees 
to maintain their patents at 4, 8, and 12 years after the grant date.  Patent renewals are 
used as indicators of the private value of patents, based on the premise that owners are 
willing to renew their patents only when the expected value of the patents exceeds the 
cost of maintaining them (Lanjouw et al. 1998).  We collected patent expiration data 
through 2005 that covers the renewal decisions of patentees four years after the issue of 
the patent for all patents between 1981 and 2001. 
3.2.1  Descriptive statistics on continuations and patent characteristics  
Table 2 displays differences in the mean number of claims, backward citations, 
the share of backward references that are self-cites, the technology-class dispersion of 
backward citations (“originality”), forward citations, and 4-year nonrenewal rates for 
patents subject to continuations.  In all of these cases, patents assigned to U.S. 
corporations that did not undergo continuations (“ordinary” patents) are the reference 
group. 
    17     
Table 2 here 
 
The first two columns compare “ordinary” patents with patents that were subject 
to continuation applications.  The next four columns distinguish among different types of 
continuation patents.  Patents issuing from continuations contain higher numbers of 
backward citations, on average, and these backward citations are drawn from a broader 
set of technology classes, suggesting that continued patents may indeed be more 
“original” (all of the above differences are by comparison with “ordinary” patents, and 
are significant at p<0.001).
18  Patents issued during 2001- 2004 to corporate assignees 
that resulted from continuations also have smaller shares of examiner-inserted citations to 
prior art (20%) than do continued patents (55%).  Table A2.1 in the Appendix tabulates 
the median number of all backward citations for 291,482 U.S. corporate utility patents 
issued between 2001 and the median percentage of citations originating from 
examiners.
19 
Patents resulting from CIPs contain significantly more backward self-citations 
(relative to ordinary and CAP patents), suggesting that they are used in patents that 
disproportionately build upon the assignees’ prior work.  CIPs produce patents with 26% 
more claims than “ordinary” patents, reflecting their use by applicants to bring in 
additional material in the form of new claims. CIPs also receive the highest number of 
forward citations within four years of their issue (a mean of 2.7 citations per patent, as 
                                                 
18 The originality measure tends to be highly directly correlated with the number of backward 
references. Our “originality” result holds, even on controlling for the number of backward 
citations. 
19 While examiners insert more citations on average in certain technologies (accounting for 46% 
of all backward citations for all patents in Computers and Communications, but only 19.5% in 
Drugs and Medicine) our result regarding differences between continuation and ordinary patents 
is robust to technology-specific differences.    18     
compared to 2.3 citations/patent in the control sample, p<0.001) , and are less likely to 
expire after 4 years of issue as compared to “ordinary” patents.  These results suggest that 
patents emerging from the CIP are of higher private and technological “value.” 
The average CAP patent has a significantly larger average number of backward 
citations and claims, but does not differ significantly from the mean “ordinary” patent in 
its proportion of backward self-cites.  Divisional patents have significantly fewer forward 
citations, fewer claims, and lower renewal rates by comparison with the reference group 
patents.  This result may reflect a tendency for Divisions to be carved out of parent 
applications (mostly in response to an examiner’s restriction requirement), and claims in 
Divisions may not have been considered sufficiently important by the applicant to 
warrant a separate application in the first place. 
The remainder of our discussion focuses on CAPs and CIPs (these are the two 
most frequently used types of continuation applications and are the focus of recent 
proposals for continuations reforms), rather than on Divisions and Combinations.  We 
exclude Divisions and Combinations from our analysis because Divisions are filed at the 
behest of the PTO (in response to “restriction requirements”) and are less likely to be 
used strategically by applicants. “Combination” continuations are difficult to interpret, 
since by definition this heterogeneous class of continuations could involve multiple 
motives. 
3.3   Technological differences  
  The economic value and importance of patents vary considerably among 
technologies, and these differences are widely asserted to influence the patenting 
strategies of firms (Cohen, Nelson & Walsh 2001; Levin, Nelson, Klevorick, & Winter    19     
1987).  Pharmaceutical and chemicals-related patents are typically rated by industry 
executives as indispensable for capturing the returns to innovations, but patents in 
semiconductors and electronics are rated as far less important for manufacturers (Hall & 
Ziedonis 2001).  Since continuations are an important element of firms’ patent strategies, 
the next few paragraphs examine differences in the intensity, trends, and characteristics 
of continued patents across technological sectors. 
Table 3 lists the share of “ordinary” patents and of the four different types of 
continuations for each of the 36-class and the 6-category technology groupings.   
 
Table 3 here  
 
Patents in the “Drugs and Medicine” and the “Chemicals” technology classes are among 
the most intensive users of continuations.  Continuations overall accounted for 46% of 
the patents issued in “Drugs and Medicine” for priority years 1981-2000, and 36% of 
those issued in “Chemicals” during the same period.  CIPs (30% of patents issuing from 
continuations) and Combinations (30% for Drugs and Medicine and 22% in Chemicals) 
account for the majority of continuations in these two technology classes.  The intensive 
use of CIPs in these classes contrasts with the Computers and Communications sector, 
where CAPs account for 50% of all continuations.  Semiconductor patents differ from 
other technology classes in their high Divisional propensity (40% of all continuations in 
this technology are divisions).  This considerable variation among technological fields in 
the use of different continuation types and trends nevertheless does not preclude    20     
significant interfirm differences in the use of continuations, the focus of the following 
section. 
 
4.  Continuations and corporate-assignee characteristics 
Continuation applications produce patents that differ from “ordinary” patents, and the 
nature of these differences depends on the type of continuation.  In this section, we 
combine our findings regarding differences in the characteristics of continued patents 
with an analysis of the influence of observable elements of firm structure and their patent 
portfolios on continuations activity, by utilizing Compustat data on publicly traded U.S.-
owned corporations. 
4.1  Data on assignee characteristics  
A challenge in linking patent-level information with Compustat’s variables is the 
fact that firms patent under various names, and assignee names may not accurately reflect 
the ownership of patents.  We used the NBER PTO-Compustat correspondence file to 
assemble a set of unique patenting entities by identifying firm acquisitions, mergers, 
name changes, and majority-owned subsidiaries between 1981 and 2000.
20  This yielded 
matches for 2,263 patent assignees to 1,273 unique Compustat firms that collectively 
owned 363,308 patents, representing 38% of all patents assigned to U.S.-owned 
businesses between 1981 and 2000.  Since firms enter and exit the data during the period 
of observation, with some instances of multiple entry and exit, our sample is an 
unbalanced panel. 
                                                 
20 Note that the NBER file is not current and reflects the ownership status captured in 1989. The 
file was constructed by assembling U.S. patents assigned to unique firms by identifying name 
changes, subsidiaries, and merger and acquisition information from a variety of sources 
(Lexis/Nexis business directories, 10-K filings, and the Directory of Corporate Affiliations).    21     
The continuations behavior of publicly traded large firms represented in 
Compustat (and hence our analysis) differs from that of privately held firms.  For 
instance, our “in-sample” patents assigned to public companies were more likely to have 
issued from CAPs and Divisions, but less likely to have used CIPs and combinations of 
continuations than the “out of sample” patents assigned to non-publicly listed U.S. owned 
entities.  These differences are statistically significant, i.e. we can reject the null 
hypothesis of equality of sample means (based on a t-test that assumed unequal 
variances) at conservatively defined significance levels.
21  The results of our Compustat 
analysis accordingly may not be representative of the broader corporate patent assignee 
population’s continuations behavior. 
4.2 Variables 
What observable attributes of firms affect their continuations behavior?  Lacking 
direct evidence on corporate motives, we test the influence on corporate assignees’ 
continuations behavior of firm-level variables such as R&D intensity, capital intensity 
and patent intensity.   
Continuations raise the legal and patent-prosecution expenses of patent applicants, 
and therefore should be more common among firms for which patents are relatively 
important as a means of appropriating the returns to innovation or for strategic purposes.  
The patenting intensity of firms therefore should be positively related to their propensity 
to pursue continuations.  We measure the patent intensity (PATINT) of a firm as the ratio 
of its patent applications that issue to R&D expenditures for each year in our sample and 
hypothesize that more patent-intensive firms are likely to rely on continuations.   
                                                 
21 Table A4 of the Appendix compares the frequency of continuation types of our in-sample 
patenting entities and those omitted because of the lack of Compustat data.    22     
How does patent intensity affect choice among continuations?  Predicting 
continuations choice as a function of patent intensity requires a more precise 
characterization of motives than our data currently support.  Nonetheless, we consider 
(and test) two broad views of the motives for continuations use by corporate assignees.   
One interpretation of continuations (as represented by the Biotechnology Industry 
Organization 2006, for example) portrays them as associated with the innovative 
activities of firms that specialize in R&D, relying on strong patent rights to trade their 
technologies (Arora 1995, Merges 1998).  According to Arora et al. (2001), these 
specialist firms (“technology traders”) include design firms in semiconductors (a group 
emphasized in Hall and Ziedonis, 2001), specialized chemical or biomedical R&D firms, 
or suppliers of intermediate technological inputs (common in aerospace and instruments).  
We define technology traders or specialists as firms for which patents are important and 
R&D investment is high.  If technology specialists favor a particular type of continuation, 
ceteris paribus, we should observe a positive coefficient for the interaction of patent-
intensity and R&D-intensity (RDINT, defined as R&D expenditures normalized by 
employment)
22 in predicting the choice of that continuation type.   
We further test whether the “pioneering” inventions of technology specialists are 
more likely to issue from continuations by including an interaction term that captures the 
multiplicative effect of patent importance (proxied by the forward citations received by a 
firm’s patents within four years of issue), R&D-intensity, and patent-intensity.  A finding 
that continuations use is positively correlated with the combined effect of R&D intensity, 
                                                 
22  Alternative estimations that normalized capital-intensity and R&D intensity by sales rather 
than employment did not change our results.         23     
patenting intensity, and the quality of firms’ patents supports the “pioneering inventor” 
characterization of continuations users. 
A second characterization of the motives for continuations associates their use 
with the “defensive” patent strategies of firms in industries in which patents have been 
characterized as less important mechanisms for appropriating the returns to R&D (Hall & 
Ziedonis 2001 in semiconductors, Bessen & Hunt 2004 in software).
23  One “defensive” 
patenting strategy relies on the accumulation of large patent portfolios for exchange with 
other firms through cross-licensing as a means of avoiding costly litigation and 
potentially, the shutdown of manufacturing capacity.  According to Hall and Ziedonis 
(2001), the patenting behavior of U.S. semiconductor firms since the mid-1980s is 
consistent with this interpretation.  Firms with large investments in manufacturing 
facilities are more likely to adopt a defensive patenting strategy, in this view, as a means 
of avoiding “holdup” through litigation.  We test the importance and influence on 
continuations choice of this form of defensive patenting by including a variable that 
interacts sunk costs and patent intensity.  Sunk costs are proxied by firms’ capital 
intensity (CAPINT), i.e. capital investments (measured as the book value of a firm’s 
property, plant, and equipment) normalized by employment.   With suitable controls, we 
can interpret a positive coefficient on this interaction term as supporting a prediction that 
continuations are used by defensive patenters. 
Since these “defensive patenters” are more concerned with the quantity rather 
than the quality of their patent portfolio, this form of defensive patenting should be 
associated with lower average patent quality.  We therefore include another multiplicative 
                                                 
23 The Quillen & Webster (2001) assertion that continuations are used by certain applicants to 
acquire a large number of “junk patents” is consistent with this less benign view of continuations.     24     
interaction of patent importance, capital-intensity and patent-intensity.  A negative 
coefficient for this interaction variable is consistent with the use of continuations by 
defensive patenters to acquire patents of lower average value (see Gallini 2002 or Shapiro 
2001).  A positive coefficient suggests that continuations are used in the more important 
inventions of these firms.  Table 4 summarizes the interpretation of our key interaction 
variables and the implications of their coefficient signs for our competing interpretations 
of the motives for continuations.   
 
Table 4 here 
 
Our earlier discussion of the characteristics of patents issuing from the different 
types of continuations suggests that CAPs will be associated with “defensive patenting” 
strategies.  That is, we expect the interaction of capital-intensity and patent-intensity to 
have a positive and significant coefficient, and the interaction of this variable with patent 
value should have a negative coefficient in explaining the probability of CAP filings.  
The data presented earlier on the characteristics of patents issued from CIPs, however, 
lead us to expect their use to be correlated with characteristics of “pioneering inventions” 
(high-value patents) and use by “technology traders” (high levels of R&D- and patent- 
intensity).
24 
                                                 
24The characteristics of “submarine” patenters are more difficult to statistically pinpoint, although 
anecdotes suggest that firms following submarine strategies are more likely to be small and use 
all three types of continuations.  Jerome Lemelson’s famous “submarine” U.S. patent 5,283,641 
covering “Apparatus and methods for automated analysis” used all three types of continuations.  
We therefore make no predictions about corporate characteristics and continuations use by 
“submarine” patenters.    25     
Our analysis of corporate characteristics and continuations behavior includes two 
other variables that capture differences in the position of individual patents within firms’ 
patent portfolios. We measure the “centrality” of a patent to a firm’s portfolio by 
computing the share of the patent’s technology class in the “flow” of patents issuing to a 
firm each year.  The value of TECHSHARE is bounded above at one, e.g., when a firm’s 
patents are all assigned to the same technology class within our 36-category taxonomy.  
TECHSHARE controls for the differential use of continuations by firms in patents that are 
more (or less) common in firms’ current portfolios.  We also capture a time dimension of 
firms’ technological focus by computing the difference in years between the year of a 
given patent’s application year and the year in our dataset in which the firm was first 
assigned a patent in the same class.  Hence, TECHTIME measures the patenting 
experience of firms in different technology areas, which may be imperfectly correlated 
with the age of firms. 
We control for other attributes that may influence continuations behavior.  Firm 
size is measured as the log of employment (EMP) and can affect continuations behavior 
because of economies of scale and fixed costs associated with patent activity (e.g., the 
cost of maintaining an in-house staff of patent attorneys).  Industry-, technology- and 
time-specific dummies control for unobserved variation in technological opportunity and 
other factors (e.g. changes in patent law, technological, and economic trends) that affect 
applicants’ decisions to file continuations.  The age of firms (AGE) is also included to 
distinguish effects due to experience and learning that are not captured by firm size. 
In summary, we are testing the influence of the following explanatory variables 
on the continuations choice of a patent:      26     
(i) the patenting intensity of firms, calculated as annual log number of patents/ M$ 
of annual R&D  
(ii) the capital intensity of firms (log book value of plant, property and equipment 
in M$/1000 employees)  
(iii) the R&D intensity of firms (log annual R&D expenditure in M$/1000 
employees)  
(iv) the quality of the invention, measured by forward citations received within 4 
years of its issue. 
(v) multiplicative interaction of (i) & (ii). 
(vi) multiplicative interaction of (i) & (iii). 
(vii) multiplicative interaction of (i), (ii) & (iv). 
(viii) multiplicative interaction of (i), (iii) & (v). 
Our control variables include: 
(i) the technological relevance of a firm’s application to its current focus captured 
by the share of its technology class in the firm’s patent portfolio.  
(ii) the patenting experience of a firm in a particular technological area, calculated 
as the difference between a patent’s application year and the year of the firm’s first 
application in that class. 
(iii) the size of firms measured by log employment. 
(iv) log of firm age.  
(v) industry-specific dummies (13 categories, based on 2-digit SIC class). 
(vi) technology-specific dummies (26 categories, based on NBER technology 
classification).    27     
(vii) application-year dummies. 
Table 5 summarizes descriptive statistics for the variables in our analysis.  The 
median Compustat firm in our sample has about 4,000 employees, spends $14.5 million 
annually on R&D, has capital assets totaling $ 250 million, and successfully applies for 6 
patents a year.   
 
Table 5 here 
 
4.3   Model specification and results 
We analyze the choice of continuation (j = {0, 1,2,3,4} representing choices of 
“no continuation”, CAP, CIP, Divisional or a “combination”) as being determined by a 
mix of invention- and firm-level attributes (‘x’ represents the vector of these factors).  
The conditional probability ‘y’ of each continuation type can be estimated by specifying 
a multinomial logit (MNL) choice model.  Note that since the probabilities sum to unity, 
P(y = 0 | x) is determined once we know the probabilities for j = 1,…, 4.  The conditional 
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The effect of each ‘x’ on P(y = j), that is, the conditional probability of the type of 
continuation ‘j’, is given by the corresponding j β . The estimations are carried out by 
maximum likelihood methods and results are reported in Table 6.    28     
 
Table 6 here 
 
The absolute values of the estimates are not particularly meaningful, and we 
accordingly focus on the relative size, signs, and statistical significance of coefficients for 
the independent variables in Table 6.  All coefficients convey ceteris paribus effects and 
should be interpreted as reflecting the effects of the relevant independent variable relative 
to patents that did not undergo any continuation (j=0).  Since this is a nonlinear model, 
the effect of any independent variable depends on the values at which the other 
independent variables are held constant.  Table A5 in the Appendix reports changes in 
choice probabilities when a particular ‘x’ changes from ½ of one standard deviation 
below its mean to ½ of one standard deviation above, with the values of all other 
independent variables held at their means (we also report changes in probability when the 
‘x’ of interest changes from its minimum value in our sample to its maximum).
25   
 The interaction terms significantly influence the choice among continuation types 
in ways that are broadly consistent with our priors.  Firms that perform R&D and patent 
intensively --- traits that are characteristic of technology specialists --- are the most likely 
to use CIPs, but this interaction term is negatively associated with CAPs and Divisions.  
As expected, the interaction of capital-intensity and patent-intensity (defining defensive 
patenters) positively affects the probability that CAPs (and Divisions) are used, but is 
negatively related to CIP filings.  The “value” of a patent affects continuation choice, as 
                                                 
25 It is also important to note that computing the exact interaction effects require taking the cross-
derivative of the expected value of ‘y’ with respect to the interacted variables.  These issues mean 
that interpreting interaction terms is not a straightforward exercise here, and that the interaction 
effect may even have different signs for different values of covariates.    29     
CIPs are associated with high-value patents and CAPs associated with patents that 
receive a below-average number of forward citations.  This effect is mediated by the 
capital- and patent-intensity of firms.  A combined increase in the levels of the two 
variables (associated with defensive patenters and captured by the triple interaction of 
FCITES, lnCAPINT and lnPATINT on CAP probability) reduces the quality of associated 
CAP patents even further. 
The uniformly negative sign on TECHTIME means that for all types of 
continuations, the longer the time elapsed between the application and a firm’s first 
patent in the same technological area, the less likely it is to be continued.  In other words, 
the more recently a firm has become active in patenting within a given technology class, 
the more likely that it uses any of the four types of continuations (at 99% confidence 
levels).  Patents in areas central to a firm’s annual flow of patents (TECHSHARE) also 
are associated with a higher likelihood of using any of the available continuations 
procedures.  The size of firms (employment) is inversely related to CIP filings, but 
positively correlated with the probability of CAPs and Divisions.  These results are 
broadly consistent with the view that CIPs are more likely to be used by small, 
technology specialist firms, while CAPs are used by large corporate patentees in 
defensive strategies. 
In regressions that are not reported here, we estimated the continuation choice 
probabilities for patents in each of the five major technology classes (we omitted 
“Others” because of the vast heterogeneity in this class).  The effects of explanatory 
variables were comparable to the combined technologies fixed-effects model, with the 
following noteworthy differences.  The interaction of sunk costs and patenting intensity    30     
had a greater positive influence on CAP probabilities in Computers and Communication, 
Electrical and Electronics, but was negligible for Chemicals, Drugs and Medicine patents.  
The computers and electronic sectors also provided considerable support for the 
“defensive patenting” characterization of CAP use.  
 
5.  The effects of the 1995 change in patent term on 
continuations behavior 
As we noted earlier, legislation passed in December 1994 changed the term for patents 
issuing after June 1995 to twenty years from application date, from the former term of 17 
years from issue date.  Here, we probe the effects of the law on the practice of 
continuations by asking three questions:  (a) did the law reduce the use by corporate 
assignees of continuations?; (b) given that one motive for the 1995 change was curbing 
the “strategic” use of continuations, did the “quality” or “value” of the average patent 
resulting from continuations change after 1995?; and (c) how if at all did the 1995 change 
in patent term affect the characteristics of the corporate assignees using continuations?    
The time trends depicted in Figure 1 are similar for all four classes of 
continuations -- the use of all continuation types grew through 1994 and decreased 
thereafter.
26  We find that the frequency of CAPs increased for patents in all major 
technology categories with a priority date between 1988 and 1993 (See Figures A2.1-2.3 
in the Appendix for charts depicting the use of different continuation types in each of our 
                                                 
26 The truncation problem (see Footnote number 17) does impact calculations regarding the exact 
magnitude of decline post-1995.  However, since we know from the distribution of pendency lags 
that priority year 1996 under-represents continuations by 6%, PY1997 by 10% and so on, we are 
confident that the post-1995 drop persists even after accounting for truncation.    31     
five major technology classes), followed by a sharp decline after 1994.  This pattern is 
especially pronounced for patents in the Computers and Communications industry -- 
nearly 25% of all patents first applied for in 1993 in this technology class were subject to 
CAPs, a share that drops to 9% in 1996.  The share of CIPs and that of Divisions for all 
main technology categories, however, are more stable during the period.
27 
Other changes in patent application procedures after 1995 make it difficult to 
conclude that the 1995 change in patent term is the sole cause of the observed decline in 
CAPs.  Conversations with patent attorneys revealed that the patent term change in 1995 
was accompanied by the introduction of a new procedure called the “Continued 
Prosecution Application” (this CPA was superseded for utility patents by the Request for 
Continued Examination or RCE in 2003) that allowed applicants to keep the prosecution 
of an application alive even after “final rejection” by the examiner.  Before 1995, an 
applicant facing a “final rejection” from the Patent Office was required to abandon the 
application before filing what was called a “File Wrapper Continuation” (FWC) for 
continued prosecution.  The USPTO treated the FWC identically to the Continuation 
Application (CAP) and as a consequence, our pre-1995 CAP patents may include those 
issuing from FWCs, a group that after 1995 is excluded by virtue of being included in the 
CPAs.  Without controlling for the FWC/CPA/RCE conflation, it is difficult to ascribe 
the decline in CAPs entirely to the change in patent term.  Nonetheless, comparing the 
average “importance” of patents issuing from continuations, and their corporate owners 
before and after 1995 can yield valuable insights on the changed use/abuse of the 
                                                 
27 We investigated the decline in use and quality of patents issuing from continuations more 
formally.  The results are in Table A6 of the Appendix.      32     
practice, and provide a benchmark for current “continuations reform” proposals (Federal 
Register 2006).   
5.1   Changes in corporate characteristics for post-1995 users of 
continuations 
We use our Compustat sample and the continuations choice model described in 
Section 4.1 to investigate changes in the attributes of corporate users of continuations 
after 1995.  To estimate the effects of the policy change, we divide our Compustat sample 
into a pre-1995 panel that excludes patents with priority year 1995 and a post-1995 panel, 
and compare differences in the coefficients of independent variables across the two sets 
of estimates.
28  Table 7 presents the results.  
 
Table 7 here 
The coefficients on FCITES show that patents issuing from CAPs are cited less 
frequently than “ordinary” patents after 1995, in contrast to pre-1995 CAP patents, which 
are not statistically different from ordinary patents.
29  This decline in the importance of 
post-1995 CAPs is not affected by the FWC/CPA/RCE problem described earlier.  
Applicants that might have resorted to a CAP in response to a “final rejection” of an 
application (arguably covering claims of questionable technological value) are present in 
                                                 
28 An alternate approach interacting application year dummies with each of the right hand 
variables was estimated with similar results, but we do not report them here. 
29 Patents applied for between 1981 and 2000 appear in this analysis only if they were granted by 
2002.  To negate biases due to truncation, we have employed a 4-year “window” for forward 
citations for all patents in the dataset in order to minimize truncation bias. The “4-year window” 
includes forward citations from the same year as the issue of a patent and three subsequent years.  
The last year for citing patents in this analysis (for patents issued in 2002) is hence 2005.    33     
the pre-1995 panel, but are excluded from post-1995 observations.
30  The 1995 change in 
patent term may have reduced the willingness of applicants with more valuable 
inventions to accept a curtailed patent term in exchange for the benefits of continued 
prosecution.  We also find a striking increase in the direct effect of the interaction of 
capital- and patent-intensity (β(CAPINT  X  PATINT)) on the likelihood of CAP filings during 
the 1995-2000 period.  R&D-intensive firms that patent heavily (the relevant coefficient 
here is β(RDINT  X  PATINT)) are less likely to use CAP and CIP filings after 1995.
31 
The above results suggest that post-1995 CAPs are more likely than pre-1995 
CAPs to be used for relatively unimportant patents, and to be used by defensive patenters.  
Examining the extent of self-citations in backward citations for post-1995 patents issuing 
from continuations provides additional evidence on the post-1995 use of CAPs in the 
“defensive” patenting strategies of firms.  This is because, a high proportion of backward 
self-cites may be one consequence of a patenting strategy that seeks to accumulate 
“thickets” of patents that overlap each other and hence cite each other.  Figure 2 shows 
that patents issuing from post-1995 CAPs contain a significantly higher proportion of  
backward self-citations than any other group of patents, while CAPs prior to 1995 cited  
their own patents less frequently than patents issuing from any other type of 
continuation.
32  
                                                 
30 This drop in quality of post-1995 CAPs holds for the larger sample of U.S.owned businesses as 
can be seen in Table A6 of the Appendix. 
31 We also examined the effects of firm-attributes on continuations choice for each of the five 
major patent technology classes (corresponding MLNM estimates are presented in Tables A7.1 - 
7.5 of the Appendix).  Defensive patenters (coefficient on the interaction of patent intensity and 
capital intensity) are more likely, and technology traders (coefficient on the interaction of 
research intensity and capital intensity) are less likely to choose CAPs in their patents after 1995 
in all sectors. 
32 We examined this result in an OLS specification with the percentage of backward citations that 
are self-citations as the dependent variable before and after 1995, and the 4 different continuation    34     
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6.   Conclusion 
The continuations procedure allows applicants to alter the timing and scope of their 
issued patents in response to technological developments and the patenting activity of 
competitors.  Despite their widespread use in the U.S. by corporate assignees (nearly 30% 
of all issued patents during 1981-2004 can be attributed to continuations), and despite the 
various patent policy reforms addressing the use and abuse of continuations, the 
procedure has received little attention from scholars of patent strategy.  By examining the 
characteristics of patents resulting from the three types of continuations between 1981 
and 2004, and their U.S. owners, we have tried to provide some preliminary evidence on 
the role of continuations in U.S. firms’ patenting behavior. 
Continued patents pend for twice as long as patents without continuations in their 
review history, and contain 50% more references to patented prior art (mostly attributable 
to applicants).  Our findings on the differences in the various characteristics of patents 
issuing from the three types of continuations are consistent with the procedural 
differences among the types.   The “Continuation in Part” allows inventors to insert 
additional material to a pending patent application and produces patents with the highest 
number of claims, forward citations, and renewal probability.  Patents in Drugs, 
Medicine, and Chemicals --- industries in which patents are widely rated as important 
mechanisms for capturing value from innovation --- are relatively frequent users of CIPs.  
                                                                                                                                                 
types as regressors.  The estimates (in TableA9 of the Appendix) which included technology-
class controls confirmed the statistical significance of the increased selfcitations of CAP patents 
in backward cites post-1995.    35     
CIPs are also more likely to be filed by the smaller firms in our sample and are associated 
with patents of high value.    
One view of continuations argues that the procedure supports “pioneering” 
inventors, allowing them to secure an early priority date while revising their claims 
during review of their applications in technologies where patents are important to 
appropriate the returns to R&D. Our results on CIPs appear consistent with this view.  
But the economic and technological significance of patents resulting from CIPs, as well 
as the tendency for these continuations to be used by smaller R&D-intensive firms, also 
could be associated with the use by applicants of CIPs in submarine patenting strategies.  
Our statistical tests are unable to distinguish the motives of applicants, and further 
research with data on the composition of firms’ R&D, licensing, and litigation activity (to 
identify pioneering inventors and submariners) is needed. 
The “Continuation Application” is a second application for the same invention 
claimed in a prior application, and produces patents that are qualitatively 
indistinguishable from “ordinary” patents.  The CAP extends the pendency period of an 
application without providing for substantial changes, and is the most common type of 
continuation within the Computers, Communication, and Semiconductor patents that 
utilize the procedure (accounting for nearly half of all continuations filed in these 
technologies during 1981-2000).  These technologies are characterized by rapid change, 
short technology cycle times, and the relative unimportance of patents as a means of 
recouping R&D investments.  CAP applicants, particularly those filing applications after 
1995, disproportionately cite their own previous patents as prior art.  These observations, 
combined with our findings that CAPs are frequent among the low-value patents of firms    36     
that patent intensively and have large sunk costs, can be interpreted as supporting various 
forms of the “defensive patenting” interpretation of CAPs’ role in patent strategy.
33   
What implications do our analyses have for the patent and continuation reforms 
recently discussed by the Patent Office and the U.S. Congress?  Our results do not 
support a definite characterization of the CIP as prone to abuse before or after 1995, but 
they do suggest that skepticism concerning the benefits of the CAP is warranted.
34  
Hence, reform of the continuations process can benefit from a reexamination of the 
purported benefits of the CAP, combined with more careful monitoring of the links 
among patent value, firm characteristics, and litigation for patents issuing from CIPs.  
                                                 
33 This characterization is consistent with the views of a number of members of the patent bar and 
rationalizes applicants’ use of continuations in accumulating low value or “junk” patents. 
34 One element of these reform proposals is a rule that would require second or subsequent 
continuations of an application to “include a showing as to why the amendment, argument, or 
evidence presented could not have been previously submitted” (Official Gazette of the USPTO 
2006).  Although such petitions might impose significant additional burdens on the patent office, 
they could aid patent examiners to evaluate CIPs more effectively.  Our results do, however, 
undermine the case for the “Continuation Application.”      37     
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Tables and Figures 
 
 
TABLE 1:  CONTINUATIONS AND TYPES OF CONTINUATIONS BY GRANT 
YEAR (1981-2004) 
 
Grant Year  All 
Continuations 
CAP  
(% of Continued 
patents) 
CIP 
(% of Continued 
patents) 
Divisional 
(% of Continued 
patents) 
Combination 
(% of Continued 
patents) 
1981 77.17  22.17  31.61  30.03  16.19 
1982 77.09  23.87  30.55  29.42  16.16 
1983 77.75  26.66  30.25  27.61  15.48 
1984 79.06  26.66  30.96  28.13  14.25 
1985 79.89  26.11  33.8  26.51  13.57 
1986 79.24  27.76  33.33  25.5  13.41 
1987 77.82  30.57  33.36  22.22  13.85 
1988 76.3  30.81  33.49  21.49  14.2 
1989 75.48  32.41  31.08  21.22  15.28 
1990 75.11  30.65  30.86  22.31  16.19 
1991 74.98  29.13  31.5  22.43  16.94 
1992 71.65  30.45  29.77  21.57  18.22 
1993 69.81  31.67  28.76  20.35  19.22 
1994 68.71  33.85  28.41  17.92  19.82 
1995 66.77  35.28  27.48  16.96  20.27 
1996 63.72  32.73  24.42  19.82  23.03 
1997 61.66  31.68  23.18  19.07  26.07 
1998 66.87  33.75  24.34  17.35  24.56 
1999 70.88  29.01  26.46  21.18  23.35 
2000 73.16  25.61  28.65  24.04  21.69 
2001 72.66  25.65  27.62  25.89  20.84 
2002 72.43  26.99  25.1  27.03  20.87 
2003 73.39  26.49  25.8  26.73  20.98 
2004 74.96  26.51  25.97  27.56  19.96 
Total (1,122,935 
patents)  72.41 29.34  27.79  22.85  20.02 
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TABLE 2: CONTINUATIONS AND PATENT CHARACTERISTICS 
 
   “Ordinary”  Continuation  CAP  CIP  DIV  COMB. 
Claims 14.72  15.14  14.75  18.73  10.40  15.49 
 [11.11]  [13.8]  [12.12]  [16.15]  [9.39]  [14.97] 
Backward Citations  11.10  17.64  16.02  16.82  15.05  24.01 
 [13.82]  [25.5]  [21.16]  [24.73]  [21.03]  [34.39] 
% Selfcites (Backward)  12.97  14.92  13.31  14.24  16.7  16.29 
 [23.71]  [24.2]  [22.17]  [24.36]  [26.05]  [24.57] 
“Originality” 0.39  0.45  0.44  0.43  0.46  0.48 
 [0.28]  [0.27]  [0.28]  [0.28]  [0.28]  [0.27] 
Forward Citations  2.34  2.22  2.37  2.67  1.57  2.12 
 [3.68]  [3.79]  [3.78]  [4.30]  [3.00]  [3.78] 
Pr. of expiry at 4 yrs.  0.13  0.11  0.11  0.11  0.12  0.09 
 [0.33]  [0.31]  [0.31]  [0.32]  [0.33]  [0.29] 
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TABLE 3: CONTINUATIONS USAGE AND TECHNOLOGIES (PRIORITY YEARS 1981-2000)  
 
CATEGORY SUBCATEGORY  NO 
CONTS.  CAP CIP  DIV  COMB. 
Agriculture,Food,Textiles  61.33 7.52  12.75  8.66  9.75 
Coating  64.5 8.06  9.19  11.54  6.7 
Gas  75.36 6.92  8.89  4.55  4.29 
Organic Compounds  59.04 6.59  10.58  13.04  10.75 
Resins  59.06 7.95  11.32  11.84  9.83 
Chemical 
  
Miscellaneous-chemical  66.91 7.81  10.22  8.55  6.51 
Communications  80 8.89  5.68  2.7  2.74 
Computer Hard- & Software  76.75 12.42  4.68  3.11  3.04 




Information Storage  73.67 13.01  3.85  5.32  4.15 
Drugs  48.94 10.48  14.68  9.51  16.39 
Surgery & Med Inst.  61.13 11.77  12.05  5.46  9.59 
Biotechnology  49.24 12.36  15.08  7.18  16.14 
Drugs & Medical 
  
Miscellaneous-Drgs&Med  60.84 12.19  11.03  5.8  10.14 
Electrical Devices  83.11 7.07  4.37  3.34  2.1 
Electrical Lighting  79.09 6.92  6.23  4.33  3.43 
Measuring & Testing  77.95 6.75  6.71  5.1  3.49 
Nuclear & X-rays  80.88 5.84  7.32  3.26  2.69 
Power Systems  80.37 7.12  5.75  4.13  2.63 




Miscellaneous-Elec  80.12 7.66  5.97  3.25  2.99 
Mat. Proc & Handling  71.78 7.62  6.63  8.64  5.33 
Metal Working  67.42 6.26  6.18  14.61  5.53 
Motors & Engines + Parts  82.94 5.48  5.79  3.67  2.13 
Optics  80.89 5.99  5.66  4.08  3.38 
Transportation  81.62 6.19  6.92  2.75  2.53 
Mechanical 
  
Miscellaneous-Mechanical  76.45 7.8  7.11  4.2  4.45 
Agriculture,Husbandry,Food  69.79 8.5  9.92  5.24  6.56 
Amusement Devices  72.15 8.07  9.96  3.07  6.75 
Apparel & Textile  76.84 7.1  8.14  4.45  3.46 
Earth Working & Wells  77.34 5.47  9.13  4.7  3.36 
Furniture,House Fixtures  78.24 7.34  7.62  3.11  3.69 
Heating  79.56 5.69  6.47  5.22  3.05 
Pipes & Joints  79.54 6.68  6.95  3.84  2.99 
Receptacles  74.94 7.51  7.95  4.33  5.27 
Others 
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TABLE 4: INTERPRETATION OF INTERACTION TERMS AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
Coefficient Sign  Continuation  used  by:  Implications 
      
β (RDINT  X  PATINT)  + Technology  traders   
      
β(CAPINT  X  PATINT)  + Defensive  patenters   
      




inventors” hypothesis  β (FCITES  X  RDINT  X  PATINT) 
-  Technology specialists for “less 
valuable” patents   
+  Defensive patenters for more 
“important” patents   
β (FCITES  X  CAPINT  X PATINT) 










TABLE 5: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS (BASED ON 9096 COMPUSTAT FIRM-YEAR 
OBSERVATIONS) 
 
Variables Median  Mean  SD  Min  Max 
Employment  (in  1000s)  4.21  17.86 45.33 0.01 876.80 
Capital Assets (M$ of property, plant, & equipment)  249.15  1986.56  6392.52  0.05  171895.80 
Capital Int. (M$ of property, plant, & eqp/1000 emp)  59.75  88.13  99.95  0.06  1983.62 
R&D (M $)  14.53  119.79  392.68  0.00  5227.00 
R&D Intensity (M $ / 1000 emp)  3.65  9.38  19.67  0.00  426.18 
Number of patents  6.00  39.34  135.49  1.00  3873.00 
Patent Intensity (Patents/M $ R&D)  0.48  1.10  2.80  0.00  100.00 
Tech Share (Share of patents from primary class)  0.57  0.50  0.35  0.00  1.00 
Tech Time (Priority year - first P. year in tech class  )   5.90  5.00  5.47  0.00  19.00 
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TABE 6: MULTINOMIAL LOGIT ESTIMATES OF CONTINUATIONS DECISIONS  
(PRIORITY YEARS 1981-2000) 
 
Dependent variable: Continuation type             
Explanatory variables  CAP   CIP  DIV  COMB. 
   (j=1) (j=2)  (j=3)  (j=4) 
log patenting intensity (patents/M$ RD)  -0.545  0.258  -0.693  -0.052 
 [0.041]*  [0.046]*  [0.049]*  [0.052] 
log R&D intensity (M$/1000 employees)  0.167  0.071  0.269  0.408 
 [0.011]*  [0.013]*  [0.013]*  [0.015]* 
log capital intensity (M$/1000 employees)  0.146  -0.004  -0.012  -0.028 
 [0.014]*  [0.017]  [0.017]  [0.019] 
lnRDINT*lnPATINT -0.016  0.058  -0.032  0.08 
 [0.009]  [0.009]*  [0.010]*  [0.011]* 
lnCAPINT*lnPATINT 0.164  -0.064  0.205  0.054 
 [0.011]*  [0.011]*  [0.012]*  [0.013]* 
FCITES*lnRDINT*lnPATINT 0.005  0.003  -0.006  -0.006 
 [0.002]  [0.002]  [0.003]  [0.003] 
FCITES*lnCAPINT*lnPATINT -0.005  -0.003  0.006  0.002 
 [0.001]*  [0.001]  [0.002]*  [0.002] 
TECHSHARE(share of patents in subcat)  0.517  0.489  0.192  0.915 
 [0.036]*  [0.042]*  [0.043]*  [0.048]* 
TECHTIME (technology lag)   -0.063  -0.033  -0.053  -0.095 
 [0.003]*  [0.004]*  [0.003]*  [0.004]* 
forward cites  -0.029  0.032  -0.09  -0.036 
 [0.002]*  [0.002]*  [0.003]*  [0.003]* 
log employment  0.02  -0.056  0.025  0.023 
 [0.007]*  [0.008]*  [0.008]*  [0.009] 
log age  -0.058  -0.002  0.034  -0.038 
 [0.011]*  [0.012]  [0.012]*  [0.015]* 
Constant -3.037  -1.952  -1.991  -2.943 
 [0.157]*  [0.177]*  [0.180]*  [0.207]* 
Observations  356753          
Model chi-square  58102.01       
df 312       
Loglikelihood -306334       
Pseudo R2  0.09       
N of observations  356753       
Note: Standard errors in brackets;  * significant at 1%; 
Base class: no continuation (j=0); Industry-, Tech- & Patent vintage- effects included  
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TABLE 7: 1995-POLICY CHANGE & MLNM ESTIMATES OF CONTINUATION CHOICES  
(PY1981-1994 & PY1995-2000)  
 
   PANEL-A (Patents with PY1981-1994)  PANEL-B (Patents with PY1995-2000) 
Explanatory variables  CAP   CIP  DIV  COMB.  CAP   CIP  DIV  COMB. 
   (j=1)  (j=2) (j=3) (j=4) (j=1)  (j=2) (j=3) (j=4) 
lnPATINT  0.502  0.518 -0.325  0.735 -1.779  0.485 -1.187  -0.976 
  [0.051]*  [0.059]* [0.068]* [0.060]* [0.111]*  [0.121]* [0.110]* [0.185]* 
lnRDINT  0.195  0.156 0.279 0.421 0.173  -0.14  0.247 0.308 
  [0.013]*  [0.016]* [0.017]* [0.017]* [0.022]*  [0.023]* [0.022]* [0.036]* 
lnCAPINT -0.133  0  -0.21  -0.226  0.538  -0.026  0.27  0.455 
 [0.018]*  [0.021]  [0.023]*  [0.022]*  [0.032]* [0.037]  [0.032]*  [0.053]* 
lnRDINT*lnPATINT  0.017  0.028 0.004 0.075 -0.127  0.006 -0.074  -0.097 
  [0.010]  [0.011] [0.014] [0.012]*  [0.017]* [0.016]  [0.016]*  [0.025]* 
lnCAPINT*lnPATINT  -0.118  -0.113 0.104  -0.163 0.502  -0.095 0.324  0.397 
  [0.014]*  [0.015]* [0.017]* [0.015]* [0.023]*  [0.026]* [0.022]* [0.039]* 
FCITES*lnRDINT*lnPATINT -0.001  0.01  -0.007 -0.005 0.002  -0.002 -0.016 -0.011 
 [0.002]  [0.003]*  [0.005]  [0.003]  [0.004] [0.003]  [0.005]*  [0.006] 
FCITES*lnCAPINT*lnPATINT  0  -0.003  0.004 0.006 -0.004  0  0.013 0 
  [0.001]  [0.001] [0.003] [0.002]*  [0.002] [0.002]  [0.003]*  [0.004] 
TECHSHARE  0.361  0.577 0.135 0.699 0.813  0.351 0.262 1.343 
 [0.044]*  [0.052]*  [0.059]  [0.055]*  [0.068]*  [0.074]* [0.069]* [0.117]* 
TECHTIME  -0.03  -0.048 -0.022 -0.061 -0.059  -0.014 -0.06  -0.094 
  [0.004]*  [0.005]* [0.006]* [0.005]* [0.004]*  [0.005]* [0.004]* [0.007]* 
FCITES  -0.003  0.054 -0.075  0.002 -0.075  0.013 -0.124  -0.11 
  [0.003]  [0.003]* [0.005]* [0.003]  [0.004]*  [0.003]* [0.004]* [0.007]* 
lnEMP  -0.007  -0.028 -0.009 -0.021 -0.005  -0.138 0.065  0.013 
 [0.008]  [0.010]*  [0.011]  [0.010]  [0.013]  [0.014]* [0.013]* [0.021] 
lnAGE  -0.039  0.025 0.084 -0.02 0.039  -0.022  -0.002  0.093 
 [0.013]*  [0.016]  [0.017]*  [0.017] [0.021]  [0.020] [0.018] [0.035]* 
Constant  -0.334  -1.544 -0.755 0.121  -4.143  -0.108 -2.787 -4.893 
  [0.177]  [0.209]* [0.233]* [0.197]  [0.421]* [0.338]  [0.326]*  [0.810]* 
Observations  223047           133706          
Model  chi-square  33506.82        23286.7     
df  288       256     
Loglikelihood  -210694.85        -92891.79     
Pseudo  R2  0.07        0.11     
N of observations  223047         133706       
Note: Standard errors in brackets;  * significant at 1%; 
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Figure 1: Continuation Types by priority year (1981-2000)
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Appendix (Supplementary Results) 
 
TABLE A1: PENDENCIES AND NO. OF CONTINUATION FILINGS  
(PRIORITY YEARS: 1981-2000)  
 
Pendency period  N of continuation filings    
   Mean Median  Mean    Median 
       
"Ordinary" patent  2.17  2  0.00  0 
 [1.09]    [0.01]   
CAP 4.22  4  1.27  1 
 [1.96]    [0.70]   
CIP 3.72  3  1.29  1 
 [1.66]    [0.77]   
DIV 3.66  3  1.11  1 
 [1.53]    [0.41]   
COMBINATION 6.43  6  3.11  3 
 [2.72]    [1.64]   
Note: Standard errors in brackets  
 
 
TABLE A2.1: EXAMINEE-INSERTED BACKWARD CITATIONS 
 (IN PATENTS ISSUED 2001-2004)  
 
   Median Cites  Median % of 
examiner cites 
"Ordinary" patent  9  55.55 
Continued patent  14  20.58 
CAP 14  22.20 
CIP 13  25.00 
DIV 12  25.00 
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TABLE A2.2: PATENT CHARACTERISTICS OF CONTINUATIONS,  
WITH TIME & TECHNOLOGY FIXED-EFFECTS 
 
   CLAIMS  BCITES  % B-
SELFCITE  ORIGINAL FCITES EXPIRY4 
CAP  -0.249  5.465  0.067 0.028 -0.191  -0.017 
 [0.054]*  [0.065]*  [0.089]  [0.001]* [0.013]*  [0.001]* 
CIP  4.025 6.145  0.291 0.025 0.496  -0.017 
 [0.057]*  [0.068]*  [0.092]*  [0.001]* [0.014]*  [0.001]* 
DIVISIONAL  -4.15 4.308  2.403 0.047 -0.641  -0.004 
 [0.066]*  [0.075]*  [0.102]*  [0.001]* [0.015]*  [0.002]* 
COMBINATION  0.964 14.681  1.419 0.058 -0.037  -0.041 
 [0.070]*  [0.079]*  [0.108]* [0.001]* [0.016]  [0.002]* 
CONSTANT  15.401 5.857  16.354 0.279  1.659  0.118 
 [15987]  [0.103]*  [0.145]*  [0.002]* [0.021]*  [0.003]* 
Observations  614215 946294  925394 925389 965922  828858 
R-squared  0.04 0.09  0.03 0.14 0.08  0.01 
df  6  23  23 24 23  23 
Note: Standard errors in brackets ; * significant at 1% ;  
Reference group: noncontinued or “ordinary” patents;  
“Originality” regression includes significant “backward cites” control; 
All regressions include patent vintage- and technology effects. 
 
 
TABLE A3.1: MEAN NUMBER OF CLAIMS AND CONTINUATIONS 
(PY1981-PY2002) 
 





Electronic  Mechanical 
"Ordinary" patent  14.87 16.35  16.08  14.43  13.55 
  [11.05] [12.55]  [12.42]  [10.47]  [10.39] 
CAP  14.18 16.56  14.79  14.46  13.57 
 [11.09]  [13.94]  [11.83]  [11.49]  [11.5] 
CIP  17.71 21.5  19.57  19.38  18.04 
 [16.57]  [18.44]  [16.61]  [15.45]  [15.05] 
DIV  10.22 12.58  11.17  10.39  9.513 
 [9.07]  [11.89]  [10.06]  [8.97]  [8.79] 
COMB.  14.02 17.84  16.16  16.14  14.91 
 [13.22]  [18.91]  [15.92]  [14.54]  [13.72] 
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TABLE A3.2: MEAN BACKWARD CITES AND CONTINUATIONS  
(PY1981-PY2002) 
 





Electronic  Mechanical 
"Ordinary" patent  10.71 11.05  12.84  9.53  11.2 
  [13.62] [15.46]  [19.67]  [11.43]  [11.41] 
CAP  14.49 15.99  16.95  14.52  16.23 
 [19.63]  [21.64]  [25.25]  [18.44]  [18.21] 
CIP  14.46 19.47  17.34  14.88  17.14 
 [23.83]  [29.99]  [27.93]  [19.77]  [20.82] 
DIV  12.94 17.13  15  15.01  15.69 
 [17.96]  [24.79]  [23.91]  [19.76]  [19.78] 
COMB.  19.15 33.53  21.53  23.49  24.18 
 [28.9]  [50.03]  [32.78]  [27.7]  [28.08] 








TABLE A3.3: MEAN % BACKWARD SELFCITES AND CONTINUATIONS (PY1981-PY2002) 
 
 





Electronic  Mechanical 
"Ordinary" patent  18.73 11.46  12.82  12.22  12.8 
  [28.92] [20.48]  [25.51]  [22.7]  [23.39] 
CAP  17.35 12.06  14.28  12.78  12.28 
 [26.06]  [19.38]  [25.31]  [20.57]  [21.04] 
CIP  19.88 11.13  13.37  12.41  12.94 
 [28.84]  [20.15]  [25.28]  [21.48]  [22.26] 
DIV  22.2 12.7  18.33  14.16  13.6 
 [30.81]  [20.09]  [29.25]  [21.15]  [22.55] 
COMB.  20.9 11.64  16.4  14.66  14.86 
 [28.43]  [18.69]  [26.1]  [20.51]  [22.14] 
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TABLE A3.4: MEAN ORIGINALITY AND CONTINUATIONS 
 (PY1981-2002) 
 





Electronic  Mechanical 
"Ordinary" patent  0.42 0.44  0.35  0.37  0.37 
  [0.29] [0.27]  [0.27]  [0.28]  [0.28] 
CAP  0.47 0.48  0.38  0.42  0.42 
 [0.28]  [0.26]  [0.27]  [0.27]  [0.28] 
CIP  0.45 0.49  0.39  0.42  0.42 
 [0.29]  [0.27]  [0.27]  [0.28]  [0.28] 
DIV  0.48 0.48  0.37  0.48  0.47 
 [0.28]  [0.26]  [0.28]  [0.26]  [0.27] 
COMB.  0.5 0.53  0.42  0.5  0.49 
 [0.27]  [0.26  [0.27]  [0.26]  [0.27] 






TABLE A3.5: MEAN FORWARD CITES AND CONTINUATIONS 
 (PY1981-2002) 
 





Electronic  Mechanical 
"Ordinary" patent  1.67 3.70  2.29  2.50  1.78 
  [2.64] [5.17]  [3.82]  [3.62]  [2.73] 
CAP  1.58 3.83  2.00  2.39  1.70 
 [2.65]  [5.16]  [3.65]  [3.37]  [2.60] 
CIP  2.03 4.90  2.68  3.06  2.17 
 [3.13}  [6.72]  [4.58]  [4.31]  [3.38] 
DIV  0.99 3.08  1.46  2.27  1.31 
 [1.86]  [4.68]  [3.39]  [3.62]  [2.44] 
COMB.  1.48 4.06  1.91  2.81  1.96 
 [2.64]  [5.70]  [3.71]  [4.46]  [3.31] 
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TABLE A3.6: MEAN EXPIRY PROBABILITY AND CONTINUATIONS  
(PY1981-2002) 
 





Electronic  Mechanical 
"Ordinary" patent  13.05 8.14  11.51  11.54  14.20 
  [33.69] [27.35]  [31.91]  [31.95]  [34.90] 
CAP  12.71 7.50  9.88 9.63  12.72 
 [33.31]  [26.33]  [29.83]  [29.50]  [33.32] 
CIP  11.49 8.16  9.80 10.88  13.42 
 [31.89]  [27.38]  [29.72]  [31.14]  [34.08] 
DIV  14.19 7.66  12.15  9.60  12.97 
 [34.89]  [26.59]  [32.67]  [29.46]  [33.60] 
COMB.  10.90 5.74  7.90 8.68  10.23 
 [31.17]  [23.26]  [26.99]  [28.15]  [30.31] 





TABLE A4: TWO-SAMPLE T TEST (WITH UNEQUAL VARIANCE) FOR DIFFERENCES BETWEEN 
COMPUSTAT AND NON-COMPUSTAT FIRMS 
 
   CAP  CIP  DIV  COMB.  N 
Compustat matched patents   0.341  0.225  0.258  0.176  96509 
Omitted observations  0.276  0.304  0.204  0.216  181300 
          
Difference 0.065  -0.079  0.054  -0.040   
Pr(|T| > |t|) for Ha: diff != 0  0  0  0  0      53
TABLE A5:  MULTINOMIAL LOGIT ESTIMATES OF CONTINUATIONS DECISIONS 
 
   CAP CIP  DIV COMB.  “Ordinary”   
lnPATINT       
Min->Max  -0.298 0.196  -0.650 0.020  0.731 
SD/2  -+  -0.038 0.017  -0.034 0.001  0.055 
lnRDINT       
Min->Max 0.083 0.012 0.108 0.109 -0.313 
SD/2  -+  0.010 0.001 0.013 0.011 -0.036 
lnCAPINT       
Min->Max  0.069  -0.005 -0.008 -0.007 -0.050 
SD/2  -+  0.008  -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.006 
lnRDINT*lnPATINT      
Min->Max  -0.064 0.094  -0.113 0.075  0.008 
SD/2  -+  -0.004 0.007  -0.005 0.006  -0.005 
lnCAPINT*lnPATINT      
Min->Max 0.336 -0.511  0.513 0.013 -0.351 
SD/2  -+  0.053 -0.021  0.047 0.004 -0.084 
FCITES*lnRDINT*lnPATINT     
Min->Max 0.329 0.122 -0.660  -0.322  0.532 
SD/2  -+  0.006 0.002 -0.005  -0.003  0.000 
FCITES*lnCAPINT*lnPATINT     
Min->Max  -0.990 -0.006 0.886  0.012  0.099 
SD/2  -+  -0.011 -0.003 0.009  0.001  0.003 
FCITES       
Min->Max  -0.085 0.774  -0.069 -0.032 -0.588 
SD/2  -+  -0.007 0.008  -0.018 -0.003 0.021 
Pr(y|x)  0.081 0.052 0.056 0.030 0.781 
 
Table A5 Notes: Pr(y|x)is the probability of observing each y for specified x values. 
Min->Max: change in predicted probability as x changes from its minimum to its maximum. 
 SD/2 -+: change in predicted probability as x changes from 1/2 standard deviations below base to 1/2 standard deviations 










TECHSHARETECHTIMEFCITES lnEMP  lnAGE 
mean(x) -6.452  0.235  9.476  2.510  10.592  3.075 










mean(x) -0.596  2.146  4.616  -1.536  -2.786  -3.797 
sd(x)= 0.976  1.033  0.750  2.571  4.612  14.897   54
TABLE A6: EFFECTS OF THE 1995 LAW --- PROBIT ESTIMATES 
 
   CAP CIP DIV COMB. 
  dF/dx dF/dx  dF/dx  dF/dx 
Fcites*y8185  -0.0004 0.0066 -0.008 0.001 
  [0.0004] [0.0003]*  [0.0005]*  [0.0003]* 
Fcites*y8690  0.0022 0.0047  -0.0053  0.002 
  [0.0002]* [0.0002]*  [0.0004]*  [0.0001]* 
Fcites*y9195  0.0005 0.0037  -0.0022  0.0011 
  [0.0001]* [0.0001]*  [0.0002]*  [0.0001]* 
Fcites*y9600  -0.0018 0.0033 -0.0029  0.0007 
  [0.0002]* [0.0001]*  [0.0002]*  [0.0001]* 
y8690  0.0259 0.0215  0.0123  0.0308 
  [0.0015]* [0.0014]*  [0.0014]*  [0.0011]* 
y9195  0.0643 0.0423  0.033 0.0347 
  [0.0015]* [0.0014]*  [0.0013]*  [0.0011]* 
y9600  -0.0439 -0.0171  0.0016 -0.0485 
 [0.0012]*  [0.0012]*  [0.0012]  [0.0008]* 
Observations 722284  717299  701873  696606 
Model chi-square  21657.39  21494.78  20574.81  33835.29 
df 42  42  42  42 
Loglikelihood -226588.03  -216147.02  -178480.46  -153361.51 
N of observations  722284  717299  701873  696606 
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets; * significant at 1%   
dF/dx is for discrete change of dummy variables (y8690, y9195 & y9600) from 0 to 1; 
 z and P>|z| correspond to the test of the underlying coefficient being 0 
 
Table A6 Notes:  The above are estimates of a model where, the binary dependent variable indicates whether the patent 
was issued from a CAP or no continuation (for the CAP analysis).  The right hand side variables include four-year 
citations (fcites), 32-category technological category (Class) and application period (App).  The coefficient on the 
interaction term ( Fcites Appt ∗ ) enables us to test for changes in the relationship between patent quality and CAPs 
during the 1981 – 2002 period.  Instead of using dummies for the twenty application years and their corresponding quality 
interaction terms, we grouped the years into four application periods (1981-85, 1986-90, 1991-95, 1995-2000), after 
ensuring that this does not affect our key results. 
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TABLE A7.1: 1995-POLICY CHANGE & MLNM ESTIMATES OF CONTINUATION CHOICES (1981-
1994 & 1995-2000) FOR CHEMICAL PATENTS 
 
   PANEL-A (Patents with PY1981-1994)  PANEL-B (Patents with PY1995-2000) 
Explanatory variables  CAP   CIP  DIV  COMB.  CAP   CIP  DIV  COMB. 
   (j=1)  (j=2) (j=3) (j=4) (j=1)  (j=2) (j=3) (j=4) 
lnPATINT  0.669  1  -0.393 1.07  -1.002  -0.139 -0.951 -0.183 
  [0.124]*  [0.118]* [0.123]* [0.123]* [0.351]*  [0.276]  [0.244]* [0.458] 
lnRDINT  0.057  0.193 0.297 0.325 0.163  -0.142  0.302 0.054 
  [0.032]  [0.030]* [0.032]* [0.032]* [0.071]  [0.063]  [0.054]* [0.093] 
lnCAPINT  -0.209  -0.057 -0.223 -0.453 0.221  0  0.177  0.21 
 [0.043]*  [0.040]  [0.042]*  [0.043]*  [0.106]  [0.089] [0.080] [0.145] 
lnRDINT*lnPATINT  0.025  0.026 -0.094  -0.002  -0.025 0.029 -0.11 -0.319 
 [0.026]  [0.025]  [0.026]*  [0.025]  [0.050] [0.041]  [0.034]*  [0.059]* 
lnCAPINT*lnPATINT  -0.189  -0.22 0.156 -0.248  0.239  0.022 0.264 0.264 
  [0.028]*  [0.026]* [0.027]* [0.027]* [0.066]*  [0.053]  [0.045]* [0.090]* 
FCITES*lnRDINT*lnPATINT  0.004  0.016 0.018 0.001 0.04  0.006 -0.002  0.087 
  [0.008]  [0.007] [0.013] [0.009] [0.015]* [0.011] [0.018] [0.021]* 
FCITES*lnCAPINT*lnPATINT -0.005  -0.007  -0.012 0  -0.026  -0.004 0.011  -0.059 
  [0.004]  [0.003] [0.007] [0.004] [0.008]* [0.006] [0.010] [0.011]* 
TECHSHARE  0.342  0.525 -0.035  0.23  0.5  1.145 -0.114  0.879 
 [0.107]*  [0.097]*  [0.103]  [0.106]  [0.227] [0.174]*  [0.176]  [0.305]* 
TECHTIME  -0.028  0.003 -0.03 -0.035  -0.048 -0.04 -0.07 -0.096 
  [0.012]  [0.014] [0.013] [0.013]*  [0.014]*  [0.012]* [0.010]* [0.018]* 
FCITES -0.011  0.058  -0.198  -0.026 -0.067  0.01  -0.185 -0.209 
  [0.009]  [0.006]* [0.012]* [0.009]* [0.014]* [0.010] [0.014]*  [0.032]* 
lnEMP  -0.063  0.018 -0.008  -0.053  -0.072 0.014 -0.033  -0.028 
  [0.019]*  [0.018] [0.018] [0.019]*  [0.035]  [0.029] [0.027] [0.050] 
lnAGE  -0.04  -0.018 0.12  -0.011 0.152  -0.015 0.032  0.149 
 [0.027]  [0.027]  [0.029]*  [0.029]  [0.053]* [0.039] [0.034] [0.076] 
Constant  0.393  -2.961 -0.61  0.115  -3.496  -1.144 -1.268 -2.488 
 [0.294]  [0.303]*  [0.297]  [0.312]  [1.202]* [0.656] [0.633] [1.175] 
Observations  55791           17729          
Model  chi-square  3744.16        1897.92      
df  148        116      
Loglikelihood  -63061.2        -15472.5      
Pseudo  R2  0.03        0.06      
N of observations  55791         17729      
Note:  Standard errors in brackets;  * significant at 1%; 
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TABLE A7.2: 1995-POLICY CHANGE & MLNM ESTIMATES OF CONTINUATION CHOICES (1981-
1994 & 1995-2000) FOR COMPUTERS & COMMUNICATION PATENTS 
 
   PANEL-A (Patents with PY1981-1994)  PANEL-B (Patents with PY1995-2000) 
Explanatory vars.  CAP   CIP  DIV  COMB.  CAP   CIP  DIV  COMB. 
   (j=1) (j=2) (j=3) (j=4) (j=1) (j=2) (j=3) (j=4) 
lnPATINT  -0.204 -0.237 -0.804 -0.722 -1.646 1.438  -2.201 -1.138 
 [0.123]  [0.197]  [0.260]*  [0.207]*  [0.200]* [0.254]* [0.299]* [0.455] 
lnRDINT  0.348 0.159 0.047 0.327 0.221 -0.186  0.332 0.198 
 [0.033]*  [0.052]*  [0.062]  [0.055]*  [0.042]* [0.048]* [0.069]* [0.095] 
lnCAPINT  0.045 0.017 -0.065  -0.124  0.477 0.017 0.409 0.366 
  [0.039] [0.060] [0.078] [0.065] [0.054]* [0.071]  [0.079]* [0.132]* 
lnRDINT*lnPATINT -0.039  0.05  -0.016  -0.009 -0.365 -0.054 -0.094 -0.496 
  [0.025] [0.037] [0.052] [0.041] [0.041]*  [0.049] [0.062] [0.081]* 
lnCAPINT*lnPATINT  0.096 0.042 0.187 0.244 0.641 -0.268  0.571 0.729 
 [0.035]*  [0.052]  [0.071]*  [0.056]*  [0.037]* [0.059]* [0.054]* [0.084]* 
FCITES*lnRDINT*lnPATINT  0.007 0.005 0.021 0.014 0.01  0.002 -0.013  0.012 
  [0.004] [0.006] [0.010] [0.008] [0.006] [0.005] [0.010] [0.006] 
FCITES*lnCAPINT*lnPATINT -0.006  -0.001  -0.011 -0.01  -0.008 -0.002 0.009  -0.017 
  [0.002]*  [0.004] [0.006] [0.005] [0.004] [0.003] [0.007] [0.004]* 
TECHSHARE  0.448 0.171 -0.037  0.666 0.628 0.348 -0.018  1.222 
  [0.089]*  [0.166] [0.183] [0.163]*  [0.108]*  [0.147] [0.160] [0.261]* 
TECHTIME  -0.047 -0.018 -0.011 -0.074 -0.035 -0.002 -0.051 -0.053 
  [0.009]*  [0.016] [0.018] [0.016]*  [0.009]* [0.012]  [0.012]* [0.019]* 
FCITES -0.008  0.031  -0.025  -0.015 -0.072 0.013  -0.117 -0.071 
  [0.004] [0.006]*  [0.010] [0.008] [0.006]* [0.005]  [0.010]* [0.012]* 
lnEMP  0.089  -0.197 -0.16  -0.097 -0.047 -0.198 0.047  -0.194 
  [0.017]* [0.029]* [0.032]* [0.030]* [0.023]  [0.031]* [0.035]  [0.055]* 
lnAGE  -0.16  0.101 0.108 0.006 0.01  0.051 -0.106  0.055 
  [0.033]*  [0.058] [0.074] [0.066] [0.044] [0.056] [0.066] [0.107] 
Constant  -4.396 -0.419 -2.996 -3.124 -4.246 -0.413 -33.491  -2.597 
 [0.526]*  [0.477]  [0.864]*  [0.676]* [0.746]* [0.713]  [1.192]* [1.064] 
Observations  42369 42369 42369 42369 49899 49899 49899 49899 
Model  chi-square  4456.22        5680.43     
df  148        116     
Loglikelihood  -36050        -26444     
Pseudo  R2  0.06        0.1     
N  of  observations  42369        49899     
Note:  Standard errors in brackets; * significant at 1%; 
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TABLE A7.3: 1995-POLICY CHANGE & MLNM ESTIMATES OF CONTINUATION CHOICES (1981-
1994 & 1995-2000) FOR DRUGS & MEDICAL PATENTS 
 
   PANEL-A (Patents with PY1981-1994)  PANEL-B (Patents with PY1995-2000) 
Explanatory vars.  CAP   CIP  Div  Comb  CAP   CIP  Div  Comb 
   (j=1) (j=2) (j=3) (j=4) (j=1) (j=2) (j=3) (j=4) 
lnPATINT  0.825  0.41 -0.043  0.969 -0.865 -0.609  0.012  0.176 
 [0.128]*  [0.142]*  [0.188]  [0.124]*  [0.400] [0.459] [0.421] [0.527] 
lnRDINT  -0.022 0.125 0.101 0.456  -0.026 0.129 0.628 0.094 
 [0.044]  [0.046]*  [0.058]  [0.045]*  [0.088] [0.101] [0.101]*  [0.111] 
lnCAPINT  -0.009  0.013  0.07 -0.074  0.478 -0.103 -0.231  0.057 
  [0.054] [0.056] [0.069] [0.051] [0.152]*  [0.158] [0.150] [0.183] 
lnRDINT*lnPATINT  0.09  -0.018 0.073 0.151 -0.22 0.127 0.016  -0.196 
  [0.031]*  [0.030] [0.040] [0.030]*  [0.054]*  [0.064] [0.053] [0.067]* 
lnCAPINT*lnPATINT  -0.238 -0.05 0.017  -0.254 0.339 0.066 0.022 0.122 
  [0.033]*  [0.036] [0.046] [0.032]* [0.083]* [0.088]  [0.076]  [0.101] 
FCITES*lnRDINT*lnPATINT  0.01 0.003  -0.005  -0.007 0.015 0.014  0.03 0.057 
  [0.007] [0.006] [0.010] [0.007] [0.015] [0.012] [0.019] [0.025] 
FCITES*lnCAPINT*lnPATINT -0.005 -0.001  0.007  0.004 -0.005  -0.01 -0.005 -0.019 
  [0.004] [0.003] [0.005] [0.004] [0.010] [0.008] [0.013] [0.016] 
TECHSHARE  -0.678 0.218 0.004  -0.317 0.252  -0.446 0.529 0.284 
  [0.110]*  [0.111] [0.139] [0.107]*  [0.174]  [0.169]* [0.159]* [0.234] 
TECHTIME  0.049 -0.073  0.013  -0.03 -0.035 -0.053 -0.037 -0.078 
 [0.015]*  [0.014]*  [0.019]  [0.014]  [0.017] [0.016]*  [0.017] [0.022]* 
FCITES  -0.01  0.019 -0.044 -0.053 -0.035 -0.009 -0.052  -0.04 
  [0.007]  [0.006]* [0.011]* [0.008]*  [0.018] [0.016] [0.021] [0.025] 
lnEMP  -0.193 0.032 0.036  -0.031 0.093 0.019 0.189 0.072 
  [0.026]*  [0.028] [0.035] [0.027] [0.045] [0.042] [0.040]*  [0.058] 
lnAGE  -0.073 -0.047 -0.146 -0.138 -0.058  0.038 -0.127 -0.006 
 [0.038]  [0.038]  [0.045]*  [0.035]*  [0.053] [0.054] [0.044]*  [0.078] 
Constant  -20.35 -22.956  -1.662  -1.475 -25.163 -19.431 -23.916 -23.473 
 [1.075]*  [0.599]*  [1.193]  [1.151]  [1.556]* [0.000]  [1.522]* [1.515]* 
Observations  21112 21112 21112 21112 9970  9970  9970  9970 
Model chi-square  2432.93        1064.39     
df  148        108     
Loglikelihood  -27776        -9911     
Pseudo R2  0.04        0.05     
N of observations  21112        9970     
Standard  errors  in  brackets        
*  significant  at  1%         
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TABLE A7.4: 1995-POLICY CHANGE & MLNM ESTIMATES OF CONTINUATION CHOICES (1981-
1994 & 1995-2000) FOR ELECTRICAL & ELECTRONICS PATENTS 
 
   PANEL-A (Patents with PY1981-1994)  PANEL-B (Patents with PY1995-2000) 
Explanatory variables  CAP   CIP  DIV  COMB.  CAP   CIP  DIV  COMB. 
   (j=1) (j=2) (j=3) (j=4) (j=1) (j=2) (j=3) (j=4) 
lnPATINT  -0.068 -0.165 -0.611 -1.151 -3.025 1.079  -1.798 -2.198 
  [0.136]  [0.185]  [0.227]* [0.244]* [0.260]* [0.355]* [0.265]* [0.510]* 
lnRDINT  0.252 0.013 0.384 0.512 -0.133  -0.27 0.25  0.024 
 [0.031]*  [0.042]  [0.047]*  [0.052]*  [0.046]* [0.056]* [0.049]* [0.091] 
lnCAPINT  -0.042  0.163 -0.183  0.024 1.021 0.121 0.728 1.246 
  [0.044]  [0.062]* [0.066]* [0.071]  [0.078]* [0.092]  [0.070]* [0.146]* 
lnRDINT*lnPATINT  -0.043  -0.02 0.023 0.103 -0.326  0.003 -0.085  -0.202 
  [0.029] [0.038] [0.048] [0.049] [0.046]*  [0.058] [0.048] [0.092] 
lnCAPINT*lnPATINT  0.06  0.049 0.171 0.281 0.864 -0.229  0.474 0.725 
  [0.039]  [0.051]  [0.065]* [0.068]* [0.058]* [0.084]* [0.057]* [0.115]* 
FCITES*lnRDINT*lnPATINT  0.015 0.029 0.02  -0.012  0.018 0.013 -0.034  0.013 
 [0.007]  [0.008]*  [0.013]  [0.010]  [0.012] [0.011] [0.010]*  [0.025] 
FCITES*lnCAPINT*lnPATINT -0.008  -0.011  -0.006 0.01  -0.016 -0.009 0.02  -0.017 
 [0.004]  [0.004]*  [0.007]  [0.006]  [0.007] [0.006] [0.006]*  [0.014] 
TECHSHARE  0.505 0.354 0.452 0.861 0.694 0.144 1.496 1.602 
 [0.102]*  [0.141]  [0.151]*  [0.145]*  [0.143]* [0.214]  [0.136]* [0.219]* 
TECHTIME  -0.038 -0.031 -0.003 -0.078 -0.059 -0.002 -0.054 -0.08 
  [0.009]*  [0.012] [0.015] [0.013]*  [0.009]* [0.012]  [0.009]* [0.015]* 
FCITES  0  0.066 -0.016  0.026 -0.083  0.018 -0.108  -0.104 
  [0.006]  [0.006]* [0.008]  [0.007]* [0.009]* [0.007]* [0.007]* [0.017]* 
lnEMP  0.045 -0.181  0.048 0.025 -0.019  -0.235  0.299 0.009 
 [0.019]  [0.026]*  [0.028]  [0.029]  [0.029]  [0.038]* [0.028]* [0.051] 
lnAGE -0.105  0.02  0.119  -0.014  -0.036 -0.142 -0.133 -0.044 
  [0.034]*  [0.050] [0.057] [0.061] [0.053]  [0.053]* [0.046]* [0.098] 
Constant  -2.051 -1.355 -2.933 -2.256 -6.194 -0.348 -31.893  -23.704 
  [0.331]* [0.403]* [0.476]* [0.419]* [1.114]* [0.886]  [1.121]* [0.000] 
Observations  45435 45435 45435 45435 32049 32049 32049 32049 
Model  chi-square  3045.44        7798.37     
df  148        116     
Loglikelihood  -34803        -23249     
Pseudo  R2  0.04        0.14     
N  of  observations  45435        32049     
Note:  Standard errors in brackets;  * significant at 1% 
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TABLE A7.5: 1995-POLICY CHANGE & MLNM ESTIMATES OF CONTINUATION CHOICES (1981-
1994 & 1995-2000) FOR MECHANICAL PATENTS 
 
   PANEL-A (Patents with PY1981-1994)  PANEL-B (Patents with PY1995-2000) 
Explanatory variables  CAP   CIP  DIV  COMB.  CAP   CIP  DIV  COMB. 
   (j=1) (j=2) (j=3) (j=4) (j=1) (j=2) (j=3) (j=4) 
lnPATINT  0.737 0.648 -0.041  1.102 -1.887  0.201 -2.131  -2.36 
 [0.169]*  [0.196]*  [0.191]  [0.211]*  [0.408]* [0.399]  [0.319]* [0.611]* 
lnRDINT  0.135 0.091 0.23  0.647 0.281 -0.006  0.037 0.417 
 [0.038]*  [0.044]  [0.042]*  [0.049]* [0.070]* [0.066]  [0.056]  [0.112]* 
lnCAPINT  -0.385 -0.04  -0.214 -0.313 0.133  -0.211 0.501  -0.278 
 [0.059]*  [0.067]  [0.062]*  [0.075]*  [0.118] [0.115] [0.092]*  [0.185] 
lnRDINT*lnPATINT  0.076 0.044 0.022 0.136 0.02  -0.019  -0.086  0.342 
  [0.032] [0.034] [0.036] [0.043]*  [0.069] [0.057] [0.052] [0.115]* 
lnCAPINT*lnPATINT  -0.191 -0.138 0.016  -0.176 0.462  -0.041 0.497  0.536 
 [0.044]*  [0.050]*  [0.049]  [0.054]*  [0.093]* [0.091]  [0.073]* [0.147]* 
FCITES*lnRDINT*lnPATINT  -0.002  0.014 -0.03 0.018 -0.018  -0.009  0.039 -0.085 
  [0.011] [0.009] [0.014] [0.014] [0.021] [0.015] [0.020] [0.040] 
FCITES*lnCAPINT*lnPATINT  0.004 -0.002  0.018 0  0.013 0.006 -0.014  0.051 
 [0.005]  [0.004]  [0.006]*  [0.006] [0.012] [0.008] [0.011] [0.022] 
TECHSHARE  0.187 0.63  -1  1.342 0.412 0.015 -0.758  1.186 
  [0.144]  [0.161]* [0.178]* [0.166]*  [0.268] [0.238] [0.235]*  [0.386]* 
TECHTIME  -0.031 -0.047 -0.031 -0.07  0.011  0.016  -0.027 0.007 
 [0.012]*  [0.013]*  [0.012]  [0.014]*  [0.015] [0.013] [0.011] [0.022] 
FCITES  0.019  0.089  -0.081 0.03  -0.064 0.007  -0.134 -0.195 
  [0.009]  [0.008]* [0.014]* [0.010]* [0.014]* [0.012]  [0.013]* [0.036]* 
lnEMP  -0.052 -0.085 -0.13  0.052  -0.228 -0.406 -0.213 -0.366 
  [0.025]  [0.030]* [0.027]* [0.033]  [0.047]* [0.044]* [0.039]* [0.076]* 
lnAGE  0.05  0.056 0.062 -0.046  0.086 0.121 0.131 0.313 
  [0.038] [0.044] [0.042] [0.046] [0.065] [0.061] [0.054] [0.118]* 
Constant  0.273  -1.208 0.893  -2.63  -2.036 -19.288  -17.396  -20.149 
  [0.407] [0.482] [0.430] [0.728]*  [1.257] [0.944]*  [0.000] [0.000] 
Observations  33171 33171 33171 33171 14532 14532 14532 14532 
Model  chi-square  2692.68        2207.54     
df  148        116     
Loglikelihood  -27366        -9841     
Pseudo  R2  0.05        0.1     
N  of  observations  33171        14532     
Note:  Standard errors in brackets; * significant at 1%; 
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TABLE A8: % BACKWARD CITES THAT ARE SELF-CITES & CONTINUATIONS (PY1981-1994 & 
PY1995-2000) 
 
Dependent Variable:  % of self-





CAP -0.007  0.017 
 [0.001]*  [0.002]* 
CIP 0.005  0.001 
 [0.001]*  [0.002] 
DIVISIONAL 0.031  0.016 
 [0.002]*  [0.002]* 
COMBINATION 0.011  0.021 
 [0.001]*  [0.003]* 
CONSTANT 0.192  0.115 
 [0.002]*  [0.001]* 
N of Observations  522858  331542 
R-squared 0.04  0.03 
df 17  9 
Note:  Robust standard errors in brackets; * significant at 1%; 
Base class is No Continuation; 
All estimates include tech class- and patent vintage- effects  
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Figure A2.1: CAP Use by Technology
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Figure A2.3: Divisional Use by Technology
 